Explaining Private Provision of Public Goods by Conditional Cooperation - An Evoltuionary Approach -

Maria Vittoria Levati ()

Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: We adopt an evolutionary approach to investigate whether and when conditional cooperation can explain the voluntary contribution phenomenon often observed in public goods experiments and real life. Formally, conditional cooperation is captured by a regret parameter describing how much an individual regrets to contribute less than average. We find that the evolutionary stability of conditional cooperation depends on what is known about the (individual) regret parameters of other group members.

Keywords: public goods game; conditional cooperation; evolutionary stability; informational costs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 C71 D82 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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