Information and Communication in Sequential Bargaining

Jeannette Brosig, Axel Ockenfels and Joachim Weimann

Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: In experimental bargaining with incomplete information, we vary the information distribution (symmetric and asymmetric), the direction of electronic pre-play communication (no, one-way, and two-way), and the electronic communication medium (email and video) Bargaining out-comes are influenced by the information and communication configurations, but not by the communication medium. In particular, sellers earn more when being informed about buyers' reservation prices (though they are willing to allocate more to buyers than theoretically pre-dicted), but less when communication opportunities are provided.

Keywords: sequential bargaining; incomplete information; communication; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C91 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
Date: 2003-04
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