A Comparison of Punishment Rules in Repeated Public Good Games - An Experimental Study -

Torsten Decker, Andreas Stiehler and Martin Strobel

Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: In this experimental study we analyze one individual and three collective punishment rules in a public good setting. We present evidence and explanations for differences between the rules concerning punishment intensity, contribution and profit levels, as well as justice. Finally, we investigate influences crucial to participants' support for a collective rule when the individual rule is the status quo. We show that besides profit differences the degree of consent required by the collective rule is essential for the degree of support by the participants.

Keywords: public good experiments; punishment; collective action; voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-pol
Date: 2003-05
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:esi:discus:2003-11

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