Partner selection in public goods experiments

Giorgio Coricelli (), Dietmar Fehr and Gerlinde Fellner ()

Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: This paper studies the e_ect of introducing costly partner selection for the voluntary contribution to a public good. Subjects participate in six sequences of five rounds of a two-person public good game in partner design. At the end of each sequence subjects can select a new partner out of six group members. Unidirectional and bidirectional partner selection mechanisms are introduced and compared to controls with random partner rematching. Results demonstrate significantly higher contributions in correspondence to unidirectional partner selection than to bidirectional selection and random rematching. Average monetary valuation of being able to choose a partner is substantially high and remains stable.

Keywords: public goods; partner selection; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D62 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-pbe
Date: 2003-06
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Related works:
Working Paper: Partner Selection in Public Goods Experiments (2004)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:esi:discus:2003-13

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