Specious Confidence after Tax Audits: A Contribition to the Dynamics of Compliance

Erich Kirchler, Boris Maciejovsky and Herbert Schwarzenberger

Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: Dynamics of compliance, depending on audit probability, sanctions, and the time lag between audits, are investigated in a tax experiment. Compliance varied significantly over time: it decreased immediately after an audit and increased afterwards, especially if audits were frequent and sanctions high.

Keywords: Tax evasion; Misconception of chance; Audits; Sanctions; Experimental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
Date: 2003-07
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:esi:discus:2003-14

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