Indirect Reciprocity in Cyclical Networks - An Experimental Study -

Ben Greiner () and Maria Vittoria Levati ()

Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: A cyclical network of indirect reciprocity is derived organizing 3- or 6-person groups into rings of social interaction where the first individual can help the second, the second the third, and so on till the last, who in return can help the first. Mutual cooperation is triggered by assuming that what one passes on to the next is multiplied by a factor of 3. Participants play repeatedly either in a partner or in a stranger condition, and take their decisions first simultaneously and then sequentially. We find that pure indirect reciprocity enables mutual cooperation although strategic considerations and group size are important too.

JEL-codes: C91 C72 D3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
Date: 2003-06
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Journal Article: Indirect reciprocity in cyclical networks: An experimental study (2005)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:esi:discus:2003-15

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