The commitment effect in belief evolution

Thomas P. Gehrig, Werner Güth () and René Levínský ()

Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: In this note we establish that rational demand expectations will typically not evolve in an evolutionary model. In an evolutionary model, beliefs act like a commitment device to more aggressive behavior. This commitment effect has the same direction for strategic substitutes and complements and fades away in large markets.

Date: 2003-06
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
ftp://papers.mpiew-jena.mpg.de/esi/discussionpapers/2003-17.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The commitment effect in belief evolution (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Karin Richter ().