On the nature of fair behavior and its development with age –

Matthias Sutter ()

Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: Economic decisions have been shown to depend on actual outcomes as well as perceived intentions. In this paper, we examine whether and how the relative importance of outcomes or intentions for economic decision develops with age. We report the result of ultimatum games with children, teens and students. We find that children and teens react systematically to perceived intentions, like students do. However, children and teens reject unequal offers much more often than students, indicating that outcomes are relatively more important than intentions for younger subjects.

Keywords: fairness; intentions; ultimatum game; children; age (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 C78 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
Date: 2003-11
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:esi:discus:2003-25

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