Rotation schemes in politics - An experimental examination

Verena Waldner, Martin Georg Kocher () and Matthias Sutter ()

Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: Rotation schemes in political organizations imply the temporary exclusion of some organization’s members (outsiders) from decision-making. Consequently, only a fraction of members (insiders) has a direct influence in the decision-making process, whose results, however, concern and affect all members of the organization. Even though rotation schemes have been implemented in some political organizations – and are about to become more important in the European Union in the course of future enlargements – the political and economic consequences of rotation schemes, compared to an encompassing representation system, have not been thoroughly studied. We examine the effects of rotation schemes on the provision of a public good in groups. In particular, we study the degree of cooperation of (rotating) insiders and outsiders in an experiment and compare cooperation in rotation schemes with cooperation levels without rotation.

Keywords: rotation scheme; political organization; public good; exclusion; EU (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-pol
Date: 2003-11
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Working Paper: Rotation Schemes In Politics - An Experimental Examination (2004)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:esi:discus:2003-26

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