Experimental evidence of the importance of gender pairing in bargaining

Matthias Sutter (), Ronald Bosman, Martin Georg Kocher () and Frans A.A.M. van Winden ()

Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: We study the influence of gender on economic decision making in a two-person bargaining game. By testing hypotheses derived from evolutionary psychology and social role theory, we find that (1) gender per se has no significant effect on behavior, whereas (2) gender pairing systematically affects behavior. In particular, we observe much more competition and retaliation and, thus, lower efficiency when the bargaining partners have the same gender than when they have the opposite gender. Implications for real-world organizations are discussed.

Keywords: gender pairing; bargaining; principal-agent relationship; psychology; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A12 C72 C91 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
Date: 2003-08
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Working Paper: Experimental Evidence Of The Importance Of Gender Pairing In Bargaining (2004)
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