The excess burden of tax evasion – An experimental detection-concealment contest

Ralph-C Bayer () and Matthias Sutter ()

Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: We present an experimental study on the wasted resources associated with tax evasion. This waste arises from taxpayers and tax authorities, investing costly effort in concealment, respectively detect ion, of tax evasion. We show that (socially inefficient) efforts depend positively on the prevailing tax rate, but not on the fine which is imposed in case of detected tax evasion. The frequency of evasion increases with tax rates. Additionally, we observe less tax evasion than a model with risk neutral taxpayers predicts. We find evidence that this is rather due to individual moral constraints than due to risk aversion.

Keywords: tax evasion; contest; experiment; tax rates; fines (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H26 K42 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-pbe
Date: 2003-10

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Related works:
Working Paper: The excess burden of tax evasion - An experimental detection- concealment contest (2004)
Journal Article: The excess burden of tax evasion--An experimental detection-concealment contest (2009)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:esi:discus:2003-28

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