Evolution of Spontaneous Social Exchange - An Experimental Study -

S. K. Berninghaus, Werner Gueth (), Katinka Pantz () and Bodo Vogt
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Werner Güth ()

Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: Each of several exchange partners is the monopoly owner of a specific commodity which she can share with others. It is optimal to keep the own endowment, but all would gain by mutual gift exchange. Participants play the game repeatedly in constant groups (partner design) and can establish stable exchange relations over time. Will they include all group members, as suggested by efficiency, will early exploiters be permanently isolated (ostracism) and will groups become more efficient over time? To answer these questions the game is repeated once with a new group. We also vary the group size.

Keywords: Evolution of exchange networks; bilateral reciprocity; mutual gift giving; ostracism; efficient trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 C72 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
Date: 2004-03
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