Perceiving strategic environments -An experimental study of strategy formation and transfer-

Andreas Nicklisch ()

Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: Within the setting of two simple two-person coordination games the formation of subjective strategies is observed experimentally. Though the structure of the game is unknown players use their actions in order to coordinate on a specific equilibrium. Strategies enable them to interpret the opponent's behavior in an appropriate way. It turns out that more informed players coordinate faster while the strategy of less informed players is more robust with respect to changes in the game structure.

Keywords: learning; strategy formation; partial reinforcement; strategy adaptation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 D84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-mic
Date: 2004-04
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
ftp://papers.mpiew-jena.mpg.de/esi/discussionpapers/2004-26.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:esi:discus:2004-26

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.econ.mpg. ... arch/ESI/discuss.php

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Karin Richter ().