Individual or team decision-making - Causes and consequences of self-selection

Martin Georg Kocher (), Sabine Strauß and Matthias Sutter ()

Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: Even though decision-making in small teams is pervasive in business and in private life, little is known about subjects' preferences with respect to individual and team decision-making and about the consequences of respecting these preferences. We report the results from an experimental beauty-contest game, where subjects could endogenously choose their preferred way of decision-making. About 60% of subjects prefer to act in a team, and teams win the game significantly more often than individuals. Nevertheless, both individuals and team members are highly satisfied with their chosen role, but for different reasons.Even though decision-making in small teams is pervasive in business and in private life, little is known about subjects' preferences with respect to individual and team decision-making and about the consequences of respecting these preferences. We report the results from an experimental beauty-contest game, where subjects could endogenously choose their preferred way of decision-making. About 60% of subjects prefer to act in a team, and teams win the game significantly more often than individuals. Nevertheless, both individuals and team members are highly satisfied with their chosen role, but for different reasons.

Keywords: beauty-contest game; team decision-making; individual decision-making; endogenous choice; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 C92 J21 M54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-dcm and nep-exp
Date: 2004-07
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Journal Article: Individual or team decision-making--Causes and consequences of self-selection (2006)
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