Leading by example in a public goods experiment with heterogeneity and incomplete information

Maria Vittoria Levati (), Matthias Sutter () and Eline van der Heijden ()

Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: We study the effects of leadership on the private provision of a public good when group members are heterogeneously endowed. Leadership is implemented as a sequential public goods game where one group member contributes first and all the others follow. Our results show that the presence of a leader increases average contribution levels, but less so than in case of homogeneous endowments. Leadership is almost ineffective, though, if subjects do not know the distribution of endowments. Granting the leaders exclusion power does not lead to significantly higher contributions.

Keywords: public goods experiment; leadership; exclusion; heterogeneous endowments; incomplete information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-pbe and nep-soc
Date: 2005-07
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