Let the Dummy Talk! - Unilateral Communication and Discrimination in Three-Person Dictator Experiments -

Ben Greiner (), Ro'i Zultan () and Werner Güth ()

Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: To explain why pre-play communication increases cooperation in games, one refers to a) strategic causes such as efficient communication or reputation effects, and b) changes in the utilities due to social processes. Hitherto experimental support for both explanations is mixed and confounded. Our experimental design eliminates all strategic factors and allows to focus on the effects of communication processes. We clearly find social effects, but none of revealed anonymity or salient communication. The social processes invoked are very heterogeneous but not irregular for different communicators.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-gth
Date: 2005-07
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Related works:
Working Paper: Let the Dummy Talk! Unilateral Communication and Discrimination in Three-Person Dictator Experiments (2005)
Working Paper: Let the Dummy Talk! - Unilateral Communication and Discrimination in Three-Person Dictator Experiments - (2005)
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