Bribery and Public Procurement - An Experimental Study -

Susanne Büchner (), Andreas Freytag (), Luis G. Gonzalez and Werner Güth ()

Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: A procurement contract is granted by a bureaucrat (the auctioneer) who is interested in a low price and a bribe from the provider. The optimal bids and bribes are derived based on an iid private cost assumption. In the experiment, bribes are negatively framed (betweensubjects treatment) to capture that society is better off if bribes are rare or low. Although bids are lower than predicted, behavior is qualitatively in line with the linear equilibrium prediction. When bribes generate a negative externality, there is a significant increase in the variability of the data.

Keywords: Corruption; Procurement Auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-reg
Date: 2006-01
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Related works:
Working Paper: Bribery and Public Procurement - An Experimental Study (2006)
Journal Article: Bribery and public procurement: an experimental study (2008)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:esi:discus:2005-30

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