"Buying a pig in a poke": An experimental study of unconditional veto power

Werner Güth (), Maria Vittoria Levati (), Axel Ockenfels and Torsten Weiland ()

Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: We study an ultimatum experiment in which the responder does not know the offer when accepting or rejecting. Unconditional veto power leads to acceptances, although proposers are significantly greedier than in standard ultimatum games, and this is anticipated by responders.

Keywords: Ultimatum; Dictator; Fairness; Veto power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-knm
Date: Written 2005-11
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Related works:
Journal Article: Buying a pig in a poke: An experimental study of unconditional veto power (2007)
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