Are preferences complete? An experimental measurement of indecisiveness under risk

Eric Danan () and Anthony Ziegelmeyer

Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: We propose an experimental design allowing a behavioral test of the axiom of completeness of individual preferences. The central feature of our design consists in enabling subjects to postpone commitment at a small cost. Our main result is that preferences are significantly incomplete. We use lotteries as choice alternatives and we find that risk aversion is globally robust to preference incompleteness.

Keywords: Incomplete preferences; preference for flexibility; risk aversion; indecisiveness; indifference (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-upt
Date: Written
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:esi:discus:2006-01

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