Population-Dependent Costs of Detecting Trustworthiness - An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis -

Werner Güth (), Hartmut Kliemt and Stefan Napel ()

Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: If the (un)trustworthy are rare, people will talk about them, making their detection more reliable and / or less costly. When, however, both types appear in large numbers, detecting (un)trustworthiness will be considerably more difficult and possibly too costly. Based on Güth and Kliemt (2000) we analyze how the composition of a population of trustworthy, resp. untrustworthy individuals evolves if the cost and reliability of type detection depend on the population composition.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo
Date: 2006-06
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