Does anticipated aid create the need it wants to avoid? An experimental investigation

Gelkha Buitrago, Werner Güth () and Maria Vittoria Levati ()

Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: A novel two-person "charity game" is used to experimentally investigate whether anticipation of help crowds out incentives to work, and therefore impulses to help. We distinguish two treatments differing in whether the causes of neediness are verifiable or not. Helping behavior does not vary significantly between treatments, but is positively correlated with dictator giving, suggesting idiosyncratic attitudes to help. Needy subjects are unaffected by anticipated help, but react optimally to chance.

Keywords: Experiments; Helping; Responsibility; Imperfect information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
Date: Written 2006-10
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