On the absorbability of the Guessing Game Theory - A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis

Andrea Morone (), Serena Sandri and Tobias Uske ()

Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: Theory absorption, a notion introduced by Morgenstern and Schwödiauer (1972) and further elaborated by Güth and Kliemt (2004), discusses the problem whether a theory can survive its own acceptance. Whereas this holds for strategic equilibria according to the assumptions on which they are based, the problem if theories are absorbable by at most boundedly rational decision makers is hardly discussed. Based on guessing game experiments we discuss the requirements of equilibrium theory absorption and test experimentally the effects of informing none, some or all players about how to derive equilibrium predictions.

Keywords: theory absorption; guessing game; p-beauty contest; individual behaviour; elimination of dominated strategies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-gth
Date: Written 2006-12
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Related works:
Working Paper: On the absorbability of the Guessing Game Theory. A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis (2007)
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