Correlated Equilibrium and the Pricing of Public Goods

Joseph Ostroy and Joon Song

Economics Discussion Papers from University of Essex, Department of Economics

Abstract: Lindahl equilibrium is an application of price-taking behavior to achieve efficiency in the allocation of public goods. Such an equilibrium requires individuals to be strategically naive, i.e., Lindahl equilibrium is not incentive compatible. Correlated equilibrium is defined precisely to take account of strategic behavior and incentive compatibility. Using the duality theory of linear programming, we show that these two seemingly disparate notions can be combined to give a public goods, Lindahl pricing characterization of efficient correlated equilibria. We also show that monopoly theory can be used to characterize inefficient correlated equilibria.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-knm, nep-mic and nep-pbe
Date: 2006-09-07
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Journal Article: Conjugate duality of correlated equilibrium (2009)
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