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The Core of a Partition Function Game

László Á. Kóczy ()

Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën

Abstract: We consider partition function games and introduce new definitions of the core that include the effects of externalities. We assume that all players behave rationally and that all stable outcomes arising are consistent with the appropriate generalised concept of the core. The result is a recursive definition of the core where residual subgames are considered as games with fewer players and with a partition function that captures the externalities of the deviating coalition. Some properties of the new concepts are discussed.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2000-03
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http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/eng/ew/discussionpapers/Dps00/Dps0025.pdf

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Working Paper: The Core of a Partition Function Game (2001) Downloads
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ete:ceswps:ces0025

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