A Note on Funaki and Yamato's Tragedy of the Commons

László Á. Kóczy ()

Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën

Abstract: In the model of Funaki and Yamato (1999) the tragedy of the commons can be avoided with pessimistic players, while this does not hold for optimistic players. We propose a new core concept to overcome this puzzle and provide numerical simulations of simple games where the conclusions coincide or are less sensitive to behavioural assumptions.

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Date: 2002-03
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Working Paper: A Note on Funaki and Yamato's Tragedy of the Commons (2002)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ete:ceswps:ces0217

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