The Coalition Structure Core is Accessible

László Á. Kóczy () and Luc Lauwers ()

Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën

Abstract: For each outcome (i.e. a payoff vector augmented with a coalition structure) of a TU-game with a non-empty coalition structure core there exists a finite sequence of successively dominating outcomes that terminates in the coalition structure core. In order to obtain this result a restrictive dominance relation - which we label outsider independent - is employed.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2002-03

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Coalition Structure Core is Accessible (2001)
Working Paper: The Coalition Structure Core is Accessible (2002)
Journal Article: The coalition structure core is accessible (2004)
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