The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension

László Á. Kóczy () and Luc Lauwers ()

Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën

Abstract: A set of outcomes for a TU-game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible)and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating coalition cannot determine the payoffs of those coalitions that are not involved in the deviation. The minimal (for inclusion) dominant set is non-empty and for a game with a non-empty coalition structure core, the minimal dominant set returns this core.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
Date: 2002-03
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http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/eng/ew/discussionpapers/Dps02/Dps0220.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension (2007)
Working Paper: The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension (2004)
Working Paper: The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension (2004)
Working Paper: The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension (2003)
Journal Article: The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension (2002)
Working Paper: The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension (2002)
Working Paper: The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension (2002)
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