Coordination without Explicit Cooperation: Monetary-Fiscal Interactions in an Era of Demographic Change
Andrew Hughes Hallett ()
No 305, European Economy - Economic Papers from Directorate General Economic and Monetary Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission
Early work on the theory of economic policy stressed the importance of accounting for the interactions between fiscal and monetary policy. Tinbergen, and Cooper, taught us that there would be costs in missed targets, instability, and protracted imbalances if this was not done. Yet most models we use today treat fiscal or monetary policies as if they operated alone. This paper reviews the advantages of recognising those interactions.
Keywords: Stackelberg leadership; institutional coordination; debt rules; robust policies; Hughes Hallett (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 E61 F42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:euf:ecopap:0305
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