New Measure of Voting Power

Frantisek Turnovec ()

No 69, Working Papers IES from Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies

Abstract: During last two decades we observe a boom of power indices literature related to constitutional analysis of European Union institutions and distribution of intrainstitutional and inter-institutional influence in the European Union decision making. Growing interest to power indices methodology leads also to reconsideration of the methodology itself. In this paper a new general a priori voting power measure is proposed distinguishing between absolute and relative power. This power measure covers traditional Shapley-Shubik and Penrose-Banzhaf power indices as its special cases.

Keywords: Absolute power; cooperative games; decisive situation; I-power; pivot; power indices; P-power; relative power; swing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-pol
Date: Written 2005
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Related works:
Journal Article: New Measure of Voting Power (2007)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fau:wpaper:wp069

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