Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Games with Many Players

Edward John Cartwright () and Myrna Wooders ()

No 2003.123, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: Interpret a set of players all playing the same pure strategy and all with similar attributes as a society. Is it consistent with self interested behaviour for a population to organise itself into a relatively small number of societies? In a companion paper we characterised how large e must be, in terms of parameters describing individual games, for an equilibrium to exhibit conformity in pure strategies. In this paper we provide a wide class of games where such conformity is boundedly rational, that is, where can be chosen to be small.

Keywords: Conformity; Bounded Rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo
Date: 2003-12
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Working Paper: Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Games with Many Players (2003)
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