The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension

László Á. Kóczy () and Luc Lauwers ()

No 2003.50, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: A set of outcomes for a TU-game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating coalition cannot determine the payoffs of those coalitions that are not involved in the deviation. The minimal (for inclusion) dominant set is non-empty and for a game with a non-empty coalition structure core, the minimal dominant set returns this core.

Keywords: Core; Non-emptiness; Indirect dominance; Outsider-independence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-06
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Related works:
Working Paper: The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension (2002)
Working Paper: The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension (2002)
Working Paper: The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension (2008)
Working Paper: The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension (2004)
Journal Article: The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension (2007)
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