Reluctant Privatization

Bernardo Bortolotti () and Mara Faccio ()

No 2004.130, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: We study the evolution of the control structure of 141 privatized firms from OECD countries over the period from 1996 through 2000. We find that governments do not relinquish control after “privatization.” We show that the market-to-book ratios of privatized firms converge through time to those of a control sample. However, this convergence does not depend on whether governments relinquish their control rights. In fact, large government stakes have no negative effect on either adjusted market value or stock price performance.

Keywords: Privatization; Corporate governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L33 D72 G15 H6 K22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-eec, nep-his, nep-law and nep-reg
Date: 2004-10
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Related works:
Working Paper: Reluctant privatization (2006)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2004.130

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