A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues

Federico Echenique () and Mehmet B. Yenmez
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Mehmet B. Yenmez: California Institute of Technology

No 2005.120, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: We study many-to-one matchings, such as the assignment of students to colleges, where the students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. It is well known that the core of this model may be empty, without strong assumptions on agents' preferences. We introduce a method that finds all core matchings, if any exist. The method requires no assumptions on preferences. Our method also finds certain partial solutions that may be useful when the core is empty.

Keywords: Matching markets; Core; Lattice; Gale-Shapley algorithm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C65 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2005-09
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Related works:
Working Paper: A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues (2005)
Working Paper: A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues (2005)
Journal Article: A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues (2007)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2005.120

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