Cooperation and Competition in Climate Change Policies: Mitigation and Climate Engineering when Countries are Asymmetric
Vassiliki Manoussi and
Anastasios Xepapadeas ()
Additional contact information
Vassiliki Manoussi: Athens University of Economics and Business, Department of International and European Economic Studies
No 2014.101, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
We study a dynamic game of climate policy design in terms of emissions and solar radiation management (SRM) involving two heterogeneous regions or countries. Countries emit greenhouse gasses (GHGs), and can block incoming radiation by unilateral SRM activities, thus reducing global temperature. Heterogeneity is modelled in terms of the social cost of SRM, the environmental damages due to global warming, the productivity of emissions in terms of generating private benefits, the rate of impatience, and the private cost of geoengineering. We determine the impact of asymmetry on mitigation and SRM activities, concentration of GHGs, and global temperature, and we examine whether a trade-off actually emerges between mitigation and SRM. Our results could provide some insights into a currently emerging debate regarding mitigation and SRM methods to control climate change, especially since asymmetries seem to play an important role in affecting incentives for cooperation or unilateral actions.
Keywords: Climate Change; Mitigation; Solar Radiation Management; Cooperation; Differential Game; Asymmetry; Feedback Nash Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q53 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-ene, nep-env and nep-res
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Cooperation and Competition in Climate Change Policies: Mitigation and Climate Engineering when Countries are Asymmetric (2015)
Working Paper: Cooperation and Competition in Climate Change Policies: Mitigation and Climate Engineering when Countries are Asymmetric (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2014.101
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by barbara racah ().