Central bank independence and inflation: a note

Charles T. Carlstrom and Timothy S. Fuerst ()

No 621, Working Paper from Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

Abstract: We document increased central bank independence within the set of industrialized nations. This increased independence can account for nearly two thirds of the improved inflation performance of these nations over the last two decades.

Keywords: Banks and banking, Central; Inflation (Finance) (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac and nep-mon
Date: 2006
View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/Workpaper/2006/wp0621.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND INFLATION: A NOTE (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedcwp:0621

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper from Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Diane Rosenberger ().