Imperfect state verification and financial contracting

Joseph Haubrich ()

No 9506, Working Paper from Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

Abstract: An argument that in a costly state verification model of financial contracting, relaxing the assumption of perfect verification makes the measurement of information difficult.

Keywords: Contracts; Information theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995
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