Dynamic commitment and imperfect policy rules

Joseph Haubrich () and Joseph A. Ritter

No 9601, Working Paper from Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

Abstract: An examination of the dynamics of commitment, showing that because the decision regarding rules versus discretion occurs in real time, opting for discretion is often the better choice, since it leaves open the possibility of adopting rules later on.

Keywords: Monetary; policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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Working Paper: Dynamic commitment and imperfect policy rules (1998)
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