Appointing the median voter of a policy board

Christopher Waller ()

No 9802, Working Paper from Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

Abstract: A description of a model which demonstrates that delegating monetary policy to an independent policy board with discretionary powers substantially reduces policy uncertainty while maintaining political accountability.

Keywords: Business cycles; Economic policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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