The FDICIA and bank CEOs' pay-performance relationship: an empirical investigation

Ying Yan

No 9805, Working Paper from Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

Abstract: A look at how the FDICIA changes the relationship between pay and performance for bank CEOs. It finds that the legislation improves healthy banks’ growth opportunities, making their CEOs’ total compensation less sensitive to performance. For unhealthy banks, total compensation becomes more performance-sensitive.

Keywords: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991; Executives - Salaries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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