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Non-economic engagement and international exchange: the case of environmental treaties

Andrew Rose () and Mark M Spiegel ()

No 2006-33, Working Paper Series from Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco

Abstract: We examine the role of non-economic partnerships in promoting international economic exchange. Since far-sighted countries are more willing to join costly international partnerships such as environmental treaties, environmental engagement tends to encourage international lending. Countries with such non-economic partnerships also find it easier to engage in economic exchanges since they face the possibility that debt default might also spill over to hinder their non-economic relationships. We present a theoretical model of these ideas, and then verify their empirical importance using a bilateral cross-section of data on international crossholdings of assets and environmental treaties. Our results support the notion that international environmental cooperation facilitates economic exchange.

Keywords: Debt (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env
Date: 2006
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Related works:
Working Paper: Non-Economic Engagement and International Exchange: The Case of Environmental Treaties (2006) Downloads
Working Paper: Non-Economic Engagement and International Exchange: The Case of Environmental Treaties (2008) Downloads
Journal Article: Noneconomic Engagement and International Exchange: The Case of Environmental Treaties (2009) Downloads
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