Antidumping policy under imperfect competition

Meredith Crowley ()

No WP-01-21, Working Paper Series from Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

Abstract: As average tariff rates have fallen, countries have increasingly turned to GATT-sanctioned ``special protection'' - especially antidumping duties - to restrict imports when import volumes increase suddenly. In this paper, I analyze a model of dumping among imperfectly competitive firms that face stochastic demand. I show that an antidumping duty can improve an importing-country's welfare when it faces dumping caused by weak foreign demand. Interestingly, the antidumping duty does not completely stem the tide of dumped imports, but it improves welfare through shifting some of the dumping firm's rents to the home country. Even when faced with an antidumping duty, a foreign firm that serves more than one market will prefer dumping and paying an antidumping duty over negotiating a voluntary export restraint because dumping allows it to earn higher revenues in its own market.

Keywords: Antidumping; duties (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pke
Date: 2001
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/workingpapers/papers/Wp2001-21.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedhwp:wp-01-21

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.frbchi.or ... nt_order_script.html

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper Series from Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Diane Rosenberger ().