Redistribution, taxes, and the median voter

Marco Bassetto and Jess Benhabib ()

No WP-06-02, Working Paper Series from Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

Abstract: We study a simple model of production, accumulation, and redistribution, where agents are heterogeneous in their initial wealth, and a sequence of redistributive tax rates is voted upon. Though the policy is infinite-dimensional, we prove that a median voter theorem holds if households have identical, Gorman aggregable preferences; furthermore, the tax policy preferred by the median voter has the “bang- bang” property.

Keywords: Taxation; Wealth (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pbe, nep-pol and nep-pub
Date: 2006
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Related works:
Working Paper: Redistribution, Taxes, and the Median Voter (2006)
Journal Article: Redistribution, Taxes and the Median Voter (2006)
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