Gender differences in education in a dynamic household bargaining model

E. Cristina Echevarria and Antonio Merlo ()

No 195, Staff Report from Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Abstract: We interpret observed gender differences in education as the equilibrium outcome of a two-sex overlapping generations model where men and women of each generation bargain over consumption, number of children, and investment in education of their children conditional on gender. This model represents a new framework for the analysis of the process of intrahousehold decision making in an intergenerational setting.

Keywords: Education (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995
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Related works:
Working Paper: - GENDER DIFFERENCES IN EDUCATION IN A DYNAMIC HOUSEHOLD BARGAINING MODEL (1997)
Journal Article: Gender Differences in Education in a Dynamic Household Bargaining Model (1999)
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