Dynamic games with hidden actions and hidden states

Harold Cole () and Narayana Kocherlakota ()

No 254, Staff Report from Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Abstract: We consider a class of dynamic games in which each player’s actions are unobservable to the other players and each player’s actions can influence a state variable that is unobservable to the other players. We develop an algorithm that solves for the subset of sequential equilibria in which equilibrium strategies depend on private information only through the privately observed state.

Keywords: Game; theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
Date: 1998
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Related works:
Working Paper: Dynamic games with hidden actions and hidden states (1997)
Journal Article: Dynamic Games with Hidden Actions and Hidden States (2001)
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