The winner's curse in banking

Sherrill Shaffer ()

No 97-25, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

Abstract: Theoretical studies have noted that loan applications rejected by one bank can apply at another bank, systematically worsening the pool of applicants faced by all banks. This paper presents the first empirical evidence of this effect and explores some additional ramifications, including the role of common filters, such as commercially available credit scoring models, in mitigating this adverse selection, implications for de novo banks, implications for banks' incentives to comply with fair lending laws, and macroeconomic effects.

Keywords: Bank loans; Credit scoring systems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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Related works:
Journal Article: The Winner's Curse in Banking (1998)
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