Reciprocity, Materialism and Welfare: An Evolutionary Model

Anders Poulsen ()

Working Papers from Aarhus School of Business - Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper analyses preference evolution in a bargaining situation. We show that preferences for reciprocity, that sustain a con ict-free outcome, are viable if players have enough information about opponents' preferences. However, de-pending on the initial starting point, preference evolution can in general both enhance or reduce subjective and material welfare, relative to the situation where all players have the usual materialistic preferences.

Keywords: ALTRUISM; EFFICIENCY; SOCIAL WELFARE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001

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Working Paper: Reciprocity, Materialism and Welfare: An Evolutionary Model (2001)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:aascbu:01-3

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