Autocracy, Collective Goods and the Vikings

Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard () and Gert Tinggaard Svendsen ()

Working Papers from Aarhus School of Business - Department of Economics

Abstract: In a world of roving bandits a sub-optimal provision of collective gods exists, most notably security and economic growth. This creates an opportunity for roving bandits to act as political entrepreneurs by becoming stationary bandits and as strong rulers monopolize vilence and provide centralized solutions to collective goods problems. The activities and settlements of the Vikings may to a large extent be explained in this perspective.

Keywords: ECONOMIC HISTORY; PUBLIC GOODS; ECONOMIC GROWTH (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H4 N4 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:aascbu:99-6

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Aarhus School of Business - Department of Economics
Address: Department of Economics, Faculty of Business Administration. The Aarhus School of Business. Fuglesangs Alle 4. DK- 8210 Aarhus V - Denmark
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Thomas Krichel ().