Games for Central Bankers, Markets v/s Politics in Public Policy Decisions

Alessandra Casella ()

G.R.E.Q.A.M. from Universite Aix-Marseille III

Abstract: This paper questions the link between the establishment of a common currency among several countries and the necessity of political coordination. It begins by discussing why conducting a single monetary policy is thought to be easier within a single political unit. It then proceeds to enquire whether market mechanisms could be used to choose optimally the common policy of heterogenous actors, and thus provide an alternative to political decision-making.

Keywords: CENTRAL BANKS; PUBLIC GOODS; CURRENCIES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 E5 H1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000

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Related works:
Working Paper: Games for Central Bankers: Markets v/s Politics in Public Policy Decisions (2000)
Working Paper: Games for Central Bankers: Markets vs. Politics in Public Policy Decisions (2000)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:aixmeq:00a02

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