Stability of Coalition Structures and the Principle of Optimal Partitioning

Michel Le Breton () and Shlomo Weber ()

G.R.E.Q.A.M. from Universite Aix-Marseille III

Keywords: economic; models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995
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Working Paper: Stability of Coalition Structures and the Principle of Optimal Partitioning (1992)
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