Price Decline in Sequential Auction: Reasons and Measures

Olivier CHANEL and S. Vincent

G.R.E.Q.A.M. from Universite Aix-Marseille III

Abstract: Price tendencies in sequential auctions are of importance for all sectors: sellers, buyers and auctioneers. If prices shows systematic declines or increases opportunities are lost, revealing some kind of inefficiency. It is then important to carefully study the price movements in auctions, determining if they really constitute an anomaly. We focus on the explanations for price declines given by auction theory in order to explain the decline underlined by some empirical studies.

Keywords: AUCTIONS; SIMULATION; PRICES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C15 C43 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998

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